December 25, the Russian government under Yeltsin's leadership
then assumed many of the former superpower's responsibilities for
defense, foreign affairs, and finance.
As president of an independent Russia, Yeltsin set about the
formidable task of transforming his country's decaying command
economy into one based on free markets and private enterprise.
Early in 1992 he ended government price subsidies and controls
over food and other consumer goods, while also allowing the
unhindered growth of free markets in the cities. In
September-October 1993 Yeltsin's leadership was severely tested
when hard-line legislators staged a coup after Yeltsin had
dissolved parliament. Although the coup was suppressed, Yeltsin's
supporters fared poorly in elections held in December.
EUROPE ADRIFT AFTER THE COLD WAR: Relations with Russia.
20th-Century International Relations Relations with Russia.
Even the prospect of a unified Europe could not ensure peace and
prosperity unless two other issues were addressed: the future of
NATO and the relationship among the EU, the United States, and the
struggling democracies of eastern Europe, above all Russia.
Western relations with the new Russia began auspiciously. In early
1992 Yeltsin toured western Europe and signed friendship treaties
with Britain and France in exchange for aid and credits. On Jan.
3, 1993, Bush and Yeltsin signed the START II pact, promising to
slash their long-range nuclear arsenals by two-thirds within a
decade. After a personal appeal from former President Richard
Nixon, the Bush administration also approved an economic
assistance package for Russia, and Congress voted funds to help
Russia dismantle its nuclear weapons. On April 4, 1993, at a
summit meeting with Yeltsin at Vancouver, Clinton pledged an
additional $1,600,000,000 in aid. It remained unclear, however,
how much the Western powers could influence Russia's future. Did
outside assistance hasten Russia's progress toward capitalism, or
just help it to subsidize old, inefficient industries? Should
Western leaders urge "shock therapy" to propel Russia quickly into
capitalist modes even at the risk of high unemployment, or should
they advise Yeltsin to reform slowly? Should NATO stand firm
against signs of Russian assertion in foreign policy, or might
accommodationist policies boost Yeltsin's popularity at home?
Such questions became paramount after September 1993 when a
coalition of Yeltsin's opponents in the Russian Congress of
People's Deputies challenged his reforms and emergency powers and